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Abstract 
 
 Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific character- istics 
and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support 
decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This 
paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview dif- 
ferent scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their 
objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the 
most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action   
to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in 
the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator 
that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within 
MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented 
and discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
All over the world electricity restructuring placed 
several challenges to governments and to the com- 
panies that are involved in generation, transmission 
and distribution of electrical energy. Potential benefits, 
however, depend on the efficient operation of the mar- 
ket. The definition of the market structure implies a set 
of complex rules and regulations that should prevent 
strategic behaviors [31]. Several market models exists, 
with different rules and performances creating the need 
to foresee market behavior, regulators want to test the 
 
 
rules before they are implemented and market players 
need to understand the market so they may reap the 
benefits of a well-planned action [3,21]. 
Usually, electricity market players use rather simple 
strategic behaviors. Most entities keep their biddings 
constant along the time, while others base their pro- 
posed prices in the generation costs of their installa- 
tions. The most elaborated strategic behaviors go no 
further than performing simple averages or regressions 
of the historic market prices. This matter, a highly 
unexplored and unimplemented issue, of huge impor- 
tance for the maximization of players profits, supports 
the need for the development of proper market acting 
strategies. 
The main contribution of this work is to comple- 
ment the Multi-Agent Simulator for Electricity Mar- 
kets (MASCEM) [26,33] simulator. MASCEM is a 
modeling and simulation tool that has been developed 
 
  
by this team for the purpose of studying complex re- 
structured electricity markets operation. MASCEM’s 
ability to model the most relevant market players and 
negotiation mechanisms provides the means for an ad- 
equate development and study of models and tech- 
niques to support market players’ actions in the best 
possible way. It provides market players with simula- 
tion and decision-support resources, being able to give 
them competitive advantage in the market. 
The contribution is provided through the develop- 
ment of a new computational model, implemented to 
support the development of dynamic pricing strategies, 
taking advantage of the interactive environment be- 
tween market agents and on the gathered knowledge 
during market participation. The methodology is char- 
acterized as a scenario analysis algorithm able to sup- 
port players’ strategic behavior. The proposed model 
includes four innovative components which arise as 
separate, however, complementary contributions: (i) 
scenarios definition, concerning the automatic creation 
of distinct market scenarios based on different perspec- 
tives and potential states of the electricity market evo- 
lution along the time; (ii) players profiles definition, 
which is an independent computational model directed 
to the creation of competitor players’ models, in what 
concerns their characteristics and expected behavior, 
performing analysis and forecasts of their current and 
past observed actions and continuously gathered infor- 
mation; (iii) possible actions definition, aiming at es- 
tablishing a set of coherent and realistic possibilities of 
actions for the supported player to take on an electric- 
ity market environment, taking into account each cur- 
rent context (concerning market and competitor play- 
ers’ states at each point in time); (iv) adaptation of  
the game-theory concept [6,23] to the electricity mar- 
ket negotiation environment, both concerning bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral negotiations, which is a major contri- 
bution by itself, in a sense that this adaptation concerns 
such a dynamic and specific context, with so many par- 
ticularities and constraints. Notice however, that the 
use of game theory is to support the decisions of the 
agents and not to reach equilibrium in the market. 
After this introductory section, Section 2 introduces 
the theme of multi-agent simulation in electricity mar- 
kets, outlining the main features of MASCEM, pro- 
viding an essential insight of this simulator, contribut- 
ing to an adequate understanding of the simulated 
multi-agent environment, in order to properly expose 
the advantages of the proposed work; Section 3 ex- 
plores the proposed computational model, including 
the game theory approach for scenario analysis;  Sec- 
tion 4 presents a case study based on real electricity 
market data, testing the proposed models and compar- 
ing its results with the results for the same scenario us- 
ing other two well established methodologies for deci- 
sion support of players acting in electricity markets. Fi- 
nally Section 5 presents the most relevant conclusions 
and contributions of this paper. 
 
2. Multi-agent simulation of competitive electricity 
markets 
 
Simulation tools are very suitable to find market in- 
efficiencies or to provide support for market players’ 
decision. Multi-agent based simulation is particularly 
well fitted to analyze dynamic and adaptive systems 
with complex interactions among constituents [2,7,8, 
15,22,27,29]. With multi-agent simulation tools the in- 
dividual behaviors may be studied, as well as the sys- 
tem behavior and how the individual behaviors may af- 
fect its performance. Another very relevant issue is that 
the multi-agent model may be dynamically enlarged to 
accomplish new rules or participants. 
Indeed several multi-agent tools have been fruitfully 
applied to the study of restructured wholesale power 
markets [2,8,19,20,26,27]. Some of the most relevant 
tools in this domain are the Electricity Market Com- 
plex Adaptive System (EMCAS) [19] and Agent-based 
Modelling of Electricity Systems (AMES) [20]. 
Within EMCAS software agents have negotiation 
competences and use strategies based on machine- 
learning and adaptation to simulate Electricity Mar- 
kets. AMES is an open-source computational labora- 
tory for studying wholesale power markets, restruc- 
tured in accordance with U.S. Federal Energy Regu- 
latory Commission (FERC). It uses an agent-base test 
bed with strategically learning electric power traders 
to experimentally test the extent to which commonly 
used seller market power and market efficiency mea- 
sures are informative for restructured wholesale power 
markets. 
MASCEM was presented to the scientific commu- 
nity in 2003 [26], combining agent based-modeling 
and simulation. In its initial form MASCEM provided 
the modeling of the most relevant entities that partici- 
pate in electricity markets, as well as some of the most 
common market mechanism found worldwide. One of 
MASCEM’s objectives is to be able to simulate as 
many market models and players types as possible so 
it can reproduce in a realistic way the operation of real 
electricity markets. This enables it to be used as a simu- 
  
lation and decision-support tool for short/medium term 
purposes but also as a tool to support long-term deci- 
sions, such as the ones taken by regulators. MASCEM 
includes several negotiation mechanisms usually found 
in electricity markets [30]. It can simulate several types 
of markets, namely: day-ahead markets, bilateral con- 
tracts, balancing markets and forward markets. This 
implies that each agent must decide whether to, and 
how to, participate in each market type. 
In 2011 a new enhanced version of MASCEM  
arose [33], where agents use several distinct strategies 
when negotiating in the market and learning mecha- 
nisms in order to best fulfill their objectives. Although 
MASCEM’s purpose is not to explicitly search for 
equilibrium points, but to help understand the complex 
and aggregate system behaviors that emerge from the 
interactions of heterogeneous individuals, agents learn 
and adapt their strategies during a simulation, thus pos- 
sibly converging toward equilibrium. 
There are also several entities involved in the nego- 
tiations in the scope of electricity markets; MASCEM 
multi-agent model represents all the involved entities 
and their relationships. MASCEM model includes: a 
Market Facilitator Agent, Seller Agents, Buyer Agents, 
Virtual Power Producer (VPP) [34] Agents, VPP Facil- 
itator Agents, a Market Operator Agent and a System 
Operator Agent. 
 
2.1. MASCEM strategies for competitor players 
profiles definition 
 
In order to build suitable profiles of competitor 
agents, it is essential to provide players with strate- 
gies capable of dealing with the constant changes in 
competitors’ behavior, allowing adaptation to their ac- 
tions and reactions. For that, it is necessary to have 
adequate forecasting techniques to analyze the data 
properly, namely the historic of other agents past ac- 
tions. The way each agent bid is predicted can be ap- 
proached in several ways, namely through the use of 
statistical methods, data mining techniques [9,28,32], 
neural networks (NN) [1,14], support vector machines 
(SVM) [35], or several other methods [5,13,16,17]. 
But since the other agents can be gifted with intelli- 
gent behavior as well, and able to adapt to the circum- 
stances, there is no method that can be said to be the 
best for every situation, only the best for one or other 
particular case. 
To take advantage of the best characteristics of each 
technique, we decided to create a method that inte- 
grates  several  distinct  technologies  and approaches. 
The method consists of the use of several forecast-  
ing algorithms, all providing their predictions, and, on 
top of that, a reinforcement learning algorithm that 
chooses the one that is most likely to present the best 
answer. This choice is done according to the past expe- 
rience of their responses and also to the present char- 
acteristics of each situation, such as the week day, the 
period, and the particular market context in which the 
players are acting. 
The main reinforcement algorithm presents a dis- 
tinct set of statistics for each acting agent, for their ac- 
tions to be predicted independently from each other, 
and also for each period. This means that an algorithm 
that may be presenting good results for a certain agent 
in a given period, with its output chosen more often 
when bidding for this period, may possibly never be 
chosen as the answer for another period. The tenden- 
cies observed when looking at the historic of negotia- 
tion periods independently from each other show that 
they vary much from each other, what suggests that 
distinct algorithms can present distinct levels of results 
when dealing with such different tendencies. 
All forecasting algorithms may be weighted to de- 
fine its importance to the system. This means that a 
strategy that has a higher weight value will detach 
faster from the rest in case of either success or failure. 
The way the statistics are updated, and consequently 
the best answer chosen, can be defined by the user. 
MASCEM provides three alternative reinforcement 
learning algorithms, all having in common the starting 
point. All the algorithms start with the same value of 
confidence, and then, according to their particular per- 
formance, that value is updated. 
The three algorithms are: a simple reinforcement 
learning algorithm; the revised Roth-Erev reinforce- 
ment learning algorithm; and a learning algorithm 
based on the Bayes theorem of probability. These three 
algorithms are detailed in [33]. 
Concerning the simple reinforcement learning algo- 
rithm, the updating of the values is done through a di- 
rect decrement of the confidence value C in the time  
t, according to the absolute value of the difference be- 
tween the prediction P and the real value R. The up- 
dating of the values is expressed by Eq. (1). 
Ct+1 = Ct − |(R − P )| (1) 
The revised Roth-Erev reinforcement learning algo- 
rithm [17], besides the features of the previous algo- 
rithm, also includes a weight value W , ranging from 0 
to 1, for the definition of the importance of past expe- 
riences. This version is expressed as in Eq. (2). 
 | 
| 
  
 
Ct+1 = Ct × W − |(R − P )|× (1 − W ) (2) 
In the learning algorithm based on the Bayes theorem 
of probability [10], the updating of the values is done 
through the propagation of the probability of each al- 
gorithm being successful given the facts of its past per- 
formance. The expected utility, or expected success of 
each algorithm is given by Eq. (3), being E the avail- 
able evidences, A an action with possible outcomes 
Oi, U (Oi A) the utility of each of the outcome states 
given that action A is taken, P (Oi E, A) the condi- 
tional probability distribution over the possible out- 
come states, given that evidence E is observed and ac- 
tion A taken. 
 
 
 
The algorithms used for the predictions are based on 
neural networks, several statistical approaches, pattern 
analysis, history matching, second-guessing and self 
model predictions. 
One of the algorithms is based on a feed-forward 
neural network trained with the historic market prices, 
with an input layer of eight units, regarding the prices 
and powers of the same period of the previous day, and 
the same week days of the previous three weeks. The 
intermediate hidden layer has four units and the output 
has one unit – the predicted bid price of the analyzed 
agent for the period in question. 
There are five forecasting strategies based on statis- 
tical approaches, using average values or regressions 
from previous days. Even though this type of strate- 
gies, especially those based on averages, may seem 
too simple, they present good results when forecasting 
players’ behaviors, taking only a small amount of time 
for their execution. These strategies consider different 
time horizons, such as: 
– Average of prices and powers from the agents’ 
past actions database, using the data from the 30 
days prior to the current simulation day, consid- 
ering only the same period as the current case, of 
the same week day; 
– Average of the agent’s bid prices considering the 
data from one week prior to the current simula- 
tion day, considering only business days, and only 
the same period as the current case. This strat- 
egy is only performed when the simulation is at  
a business day. This approach, considering only 
the most recent days and ignoring the distant past, 
gives us a proposal that can very quickly adapt to 
the most recent changes in this agent’s behavior. 
It is also a good strategy for agents that tend to 
perform similar actions along the week; 
– Average of the data from the four months prior to 
the current simulation day, considering only the 
same period as the current case. This offers an ap- 
proach based on a longer term analysis; 
– Regression on the data from the four months prior 
to the current simulation day, considering only the 
same period of the day; 
– Regression on the data of the last week, consider- 
ing only business days. This strategy is only per- 
formed when the simulation is at a business day. 
About pattern analysis there are three algorithms 
concerning: the most repeated sequence along the his- 
toric of actions of the player; the most recent sequence 
among all the found ones; sequences in the past match- 
ing the last few actions. In the latter approach the se- 
quences of at least 3 actions found along the historic of 
actions of the player are considered. The sequences are 
treated depending on their size. The longer matches to 
the recent history are attributed a higher importance. 
There is also an algorithm based on history match- 
ing, regarding not only the player actions, but also the 
results obtained. This algorithm finds the previous time 
that the last result happened, i.e., what the player did, 
or how he reacted, the last time he performed the same 
action and got the same result. 
Another simple but efficient method for players that 
tend to perform recurrent actions, is an algorithm re- 
turning the most repeated action of the player. 
Finally, we have second-Guessing the predictions. 
Assuming that the players whose actions we are pre- 
dicting are gifted with intelligent behavior, it is essen- 
tial to shield this system, avoiding being predictable as 
well. So this method aims to be prepared to situations 
when the competitors are expecting the actions that the 
system is performing. We consider second and third- 
guesses. 
Second-Guess, if the prediction on a player action is 
P , and it is expecting the system to perform an action 
P 1 that will overcome its expected action, so in fact 
the player will perform an action P 2 that overcomes 
the system’s expected P 1. This algorithm prediction 
is the P 2 action, in order for the system to expect the 
player’s prediction. 
Third-Guess is one step above the previous algo- 
rithm. If a player already understood the system’s sec- 
ond guess and is expecting the system to perform an 
action that overcomes the P 2 action, than it will per- 
form an action P 3 that overcomes the system predic- 
tion, and so, this strategy returns P 3 as the predicted 
player action. 
  
Concerning Self Model prediction, once again if a 
player is gifted with intelligent behavior, it can perform 
the same historical analysis on the system’s behavior 
as the system performs on the others. This strategy per- 
forms an analysis on its own historic of actions, to pre- 
dict what itself is expected to do next. From that the 
system can change its predicted action, to overcome 
the players that may be expecting it to perform that 
same predicted action. 
In the Second-Guess/Self Model prediction, the 
same logic is applied as before, this time considering 
the expected play resulting from the Self Model pre- 
diction. 
 
3. Game theory based scenario analysis 
The scenario analysis algorithm supports strategic 
behavior with the aim of providing complex support to 
develop and implement dynamic pricing strategies. 
Each agent develops a strategic bid, taking into ac- 
count not only its previous results but also other play- 
ers’ bids and results and expected future reactions. This 
is particularly suitable for markets based on a pool or 
for hybrid markets, to support Sellers and Buyers de- 
cisions for proposing bids to the pool and accepting or 
not a bilateral agreement. The algorithm is based on the 
analysis of several bids under different scenarios. The 
analysis results are used to build a matrix which sup- 
ports the application of a decision method to select the 
bid to propose. Each agent has historical information 
about market behavior and about other agents’ charac- 
teristics and past actions. This algorithm’s organization 
is presented in Fig. 1. 
To get warrantable data, agents using this method 
perform an analysis of the historical data. With the 
gathered information, agents can build a profile of 
other agents including information about their ex- 
pected proposed prices, limit prices, and capacities. 
With these profiles, and based on the agent own objec- 
tives, several scenarios, and the possible advantageous 
bids for each one, are defined. 
Seller and Buyer agents interact with each other, in 
MASCEM environment, taking into account that their 
results are influenced by competitor’s decisions. Game 
theory is well suited for analyzing these kinds of situ- 
ations [6,23]. 
 
3.1. Scenario definition 
 
MASCEM is implemented as a Decision Support 
tool, so the user should have the flexibility to   decide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Scenario analysis algorithm. (Colours are visible in the online 
version of the article; http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/ICA-130438) 
 
how many and which scenarios should be analyzed. To 
do so, the user must define the scenarios to be sim- 
ulated by specifying the price that competitor agents 
will propose Eq. (4): 
  
 
where λ and ϕ are scaling factors that can be different 
for each agent and for each scenario. 
The Probable_Price is a predicted value concerning 
the expected bidding price of each competitor player. 
This prediction is reached by using the players’ pro- 
files definition mechanism, presented in section 2. This 
prediction allows the proposed method to use adequate 
and realistic values when considering other players’ 
actions. 
The Limit_Price corresponds to maximum price that 
can be bided by a seller agent, or the minimum price 
that can be bided by a buyer agent. 
Equation (4) is used to provide the definition of al- 
ternative scenarios, concerning agents may define bids 
between their limit and probable prices. 
Let us suppose that the user selects λ = 0 and ϕ = 1 
for every Seller and λ = 1 and ϕ = 0 for every Buyer; 
this means an analysis of a pessimistic scenario. If the 
user selects λ = 1 and ϕ = 0 for every agent, then 
the most probable scenario will be analyzed. Using this 
formula the user can define for each agent the proposed 
prices for every scenario that it desires to consider. 
 o 
scenarios areThe 
 
Each scenario considers a fixed number of players, 
each with constant amounts of power. Only the bidding 
prices for each player vary from scenario to scenario. 
 
3.2. Bid definition 
 
An agent should analyze the income that results 
from bidding its limit, desired, and competitive prices – 
those that are just slightly lower (or higher, in the buy- 
ers’ case) than its competitors’ prices. 
A play is defined as a  pair of bid – scenario, so,  
the total number of plays to analyze for each player is 
Eq. (5): 
 
 
and the maximum value it can achieve is Eq. (6): 
 
considering that agents only bid their limit or expected 
prices. However, an agent may bid prices between its 
limit and expected prices, or even above that limit 
price. If we consider each agent may bid numprices 
prices, the number of scenarios becomes equal to npn, 
and the number of plays to analyze is Eq. (7). 
  
The user is also allowed to choose the number of bids 
that will be considered as possibilities for the final bid. 
In this case, the value of the bids is calculated depend- 
ing on an interval of values that can also be defined by 
the user. That interval is always centered on a trusted 
value, the value of the market price of the same pe- 
riod of the previous day. In this way the considered 
possible bids are always around that reference value, 
and their range of variance depends on the bigger or 
smaller value of the user defined interval. 
So, being nb the number of bids defined by the user, 
int the value defining the interval to be considered, and 
mp the market price from the same period of the previ- 
ous day, the possible bids b1...nb are defined as Eqs (8) 
and (9): 
strategy two-player game, assuming each player seeks 
to minimize the maximum possible loss or maximize 
the minimum possible gain. 
After each negotiation period, an agent may in- 
crease, decrease or maintain its bid, increasing the 
number of scenarios to analyze. So, after k periods, 
considering only three possible bid updates, the num- 
ber of plays to analyze becomes Eq. (10): 
 
 
3.3. Game theory for scenario analysis 
 
A seller, like an offensive player, will try to maxi- 
mize the minimum possible gain by using the MaxiMin 
decision method. A buyer, like a defensive player, will 
select the strategy with the smallest maximum payoff 
by using the MiniMax decision method. 
Buyers’ matrix analysis leads to the selection of only 
those situations in which all the consumption needs are 
fulfilled. This avoids situations in which agents have 
reduced expenses but cannot satisfy their consumption 
needs completely. 
The state space to be searched is related to the possi- 
ble plays of other agents, regarding possible bids from 
one agent. Figure 2 illustrates this procedure. 
 
Fig. 2. Game theory for scenario-space search. (Colours are vis- 
ible in the online version of the article;    http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/ 
 
 
 ICA-130438) 
 
Each bid of a specific agent (e.g. Agi) is analyzed 
by considering several possible scenari  s, in order  to 
 
 
After defining all the scenarios and bids, market sim- 
ulation is applied to build a matrix with the expected 
results for each play. 
The matrix analysis with the simulated plays’ results 
is  inspired on  the game theory concepts for  a   pure- 
evaluated by considering the prices other agents may 
propose, regarding the previous proposed prices. It is 
also considered that each agent may change its  price: 
increasing a lot (↑↑), increasing a little (↑), maintaining 
(-), decreasing a little (↓), or decreasing a lot (↓↓) its 
support the decision of this  agent. 
support the decision of this  agent. 
  
bid price (A little means from 0 to 10% and a lot from 
10% to 30%). Here the concepts of little and lot will 
consider the historic data of agents’ bids and will be 
converted to variations in cents. It is important to ob- 
serve that it is impossible to consider all kind of varia- 
tions, due to the complexity of the problem, as we have 
seen before. The required time for solving the problem 
with a large set of combinations would be impractical 
since a complete market simulation is required for each 
scenario. 
Each leaf node of the tree in Fig. 2 corresponds to  
a possible scenario. The idea is to evaluate each one  
of these scenarios and apply a MiniMax or MaxiMin 
based algorithm to select the safest bid to be offered by 
agent Agi. 
Notice that our use of game theory is intended   for 
supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the 
equilibrium in the market. The idea of the methodology 
proposed in this paper is to provide a specific agent 
with decision support. 
For each simulated scenario (leaf of Fig. 2) we will 
calculate the price Pmarket for each MW.h (Megawatt 
hour), defined as the result of the simulated market. 
For the support of seller agents the evaluation of the 
scenario (in profits, F ) is made by the product of the 
energy sold by the supported agent Agi, Energy_Soldi, 
by the profit, obtained from the difference between 
Pmarket and the cost associated to each MW.h sold by 
Agi, Costi, according to Eq. (11): 
 
  
Notice that the part of this formula that demands the 
higher processing cost is the calculation of the value 
Pmarket, since it implies to run the simulation of the 
scenario in order to determine the market clearing 
price. 
Additionally, there are two methods for solving 
problems of equality in the evaluation of scenarios. In 
case of a seller, the MaxiMin algorithm chooses the bid 
that offers the maximum gain, from the worst possible 
scenario. In case of more than one scenario being eval- 
uated with equal value as worst scenario, the options 
for choosing among them are: 
– a greedy approach, choosing the scenario, among 
the equally worst ones, that presents the bid that 
allows the higher payoff from all the possible 
bids; 
– an average of the results of all possible bids for 
these scenarios, choosing the one that gets the 
worst average as the worst possible scenario. 
The user is able to choose among these two meth- 
ods for solving the problems of equality. He can also 
choose a third option that is a mechanism that chooses 
automatically among these two options, accordingly to 
the success that each of them is presenting. This mech- 
anism uses a reinforcement learning algorithm, with 
initial equal values of confidence for the two options. 
As the time evolves, the values of success of each op- 
tion are updated, and the one that presents the best con- 
fidence in each run, is the one chosen. 
The updating of these confidence values is per- 
formed by running the two options and saving the an- 
swer proposed by each one. Later, after the bid is cho- 
sen as the agent’s action for the actual market, this 
method analyzes the market values and checks which 
of the outputs proposed by each method would have 
led to the best results. 
This procedure is similar to the one used for updat- 
ing the values of the players’ profile definition method- 
ology, by comparing the values proposed by each of the 
algorithms used for forecasting with the actual actions 
the each player performed in the market. 
The scenario analysis algorithm is implemented in 
JAVA,1 for a smoother integration with MASCEM sim- 
ulator. However, for efficiency issues, the majority of 
data analysis methods, namely the pattern analysis and 
history matching algorithms for players’ profiles def- 
inition, are implemented in LPA Prolog.2 The neural 
network was developed in MatLab.3 
 
4. Experimental findings 
 
This section presents a case study with two main ob- 
jectives: (i) understand how to use the proposed ap- 
proach, by comparing the performance of different pa- 
rameterizations; (ii) compare the results that can be 
achieved with the proposed approach and with other 
reference decision support strategies. 
The results are evaluated by comparing the incomes 
that are achieved in an electricity market simulation, 
using the different approaches and parameterizations. 
 
4.1. Case study characterization 
 
This case study concerns three simulations under- 
taken using MASCEM, referring to the same 16  con- 
 
 
1http://www.java.com/. 
2http://www.lpa.co.uk/. 
3http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab. 
  
secutive days, starting from Friday, 15th October, 
2010. The data used in this case study has been based 
on real data extracted from the Iberian market – Iberial 
Electricity Market – MIBEL [24]. 
These simulations involve 7 buyers and 5 sellers (3 
regular sellers and 2 VPPs). This group of agents was 
created with the intention of representing the Iberian 
reality, reduced to a smaller group, containing the es- 
sential aspects of different parts of the market, al- 
lowing a better individual analysis and study of the 
interactions and potentiality of each of those actors. 
This group of agents results from the studies presented 
in [33]. 
 
4.1.1. Simulated agents strategic behavior 
For these simulations we will consider different bid- 
dings for each agent. Seller 2, which will be our test 
reference, will use the proposed method with different 
parameters in each of the three simulations. This al- 
lows comparing the performance of this method when 
using distinct parameterizations and taking conclu- 
sions on its suitability and the influence of the differ- 
ent parameters presented in Section 3. This section ad- 
ditionally presents the comparison between the results 
obtained by each of the three considered parameteriza- 
tions and the results obtained by using two other strate- 
gies which are well established and with verified per- 
formance and results, in order to determine in what de- 
gree the proposed game theory based strategy is best 
or worst suited for providing decision support to mar- 
ket players. These strategies are: (i) the AMES strat- 
egy [20]; (ii) the SA-QL strategy [32]. 
The AMES strategy is used by the AMES electricity 
markets simulator [20] to provide support to the mod- 
elled players when bidding in the market. This strat- 
egy is based on a study of the efficiency and reliabil- 
ity of the Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP), 
a market design proposed by the U.S. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission for common adoption by  all 
U.S. wholesale power markets [11,12]. The AMES 
strategy was adapted by the authors of this paper in a 
previous work [25], to suit it to the purposes of asym- 
metrical and symmetrical pool markets, such as the 
Iberian Electricity market – MIBEL [24]. This strategy 
uses a reinforcement learning algorithm – the Roth- 
Erev algorithm [17] to choose from a set of the pos- 
sible actions (or Action Domain) which is based on 
the companies’ production costs analysis. Addition- 
ally, the Simulated Annealing heuristic [4] is imple- 
mented to accelerate the convergence process. 
The SA-QL strategy [32] is similar to the AMES 
strategy in  its  fundamentals: the  use  of  a reinforce- 
ment learning algorithm to choose the best from a set 
of possible actions. The differences concern two main 
aspects: the used reinforcement learning algorithm is 
the Q-Learning [18] algorithm; and the set of differ- 
ent possible bids to be used by the market negotiat- 
ing agent is determined by a focus on the most prob- 
able points of success (in the area surrounding the ex- 
pected market price). This strategy also uses the Sim- 
ulated Annealing heuristic to accelerate the process of 
convergence. 
The other simulated players’ bids are defined as fol- 
lows: 
– Buyer 1 – This buyer buys power independently 
of the  market  price.  The  offer  price  is  18.30 
c /kWh (this value is much higher than average 
market price). 
– Buyer 2 – This buyer bid price varies between two 
fixed prices, depending on the periods when it re- 
ally needs to buy, and the ones in which the need 
is lower.  The two variations are 10.00 and 8.00  
c  /kWh. 
– Buyer 3 – This buyer bid price is fixed at 4.90    
c  /kWh. 
– Buyer 4 – This buyer bid considers the average 
prices of the last 4 Wednesdays. 
– Buyer 5 – This buyer bid considers the average 
prices of the last 4 months. 
– Buyer 6 – This buyer bid considers the average 
prices of the last week (considering only business 
days). 
– Buyer 7 – This buyer only buys power if market 
prices are lower than average market price. 
– Seller 1 – This seller needs to sell all the power 
that he produces. The offer price is 0.00 c /kWh. 
– Seller 3 – This seller bid considers the average 
prices of the last 4 months with an increment   of 
0.5 c  /kWh. 
– VPP 1 – Includes 4 wind farms and offers a  
fixed value along the day. The offer price is 3.50 
c  /kWh. 
– VPP 2 – Includes 1 photovoltaic, 1 co-generation 
and 1 mini-hydro plants; the offer price is based 
on the costs of co-generation and the total fore- 
casted production. 
 
4.1.2. Parameterization 
The common parameters in all the simulations using 
the game theory strategy are: the selection of the auto- 
matic mechanism for solving the problems of equality 
among scenarios; for all seller agents the limit price is 
fixed as 0 c     /kWh, for it does not make sense to bid 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Incomes obtained by Seller 2 in the first period of the 
considered 16 days, using: A) the first parameterization, B) the 
second parameterization, C) the third parameterization. (Colours 
are visible in the online version of the article; http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.3233/ICA-130438) 
 
negative values; for all buyer agents the limit price is 
20 c /kWh, a high value for allowing the players to 
consider a good margin of prices. Also, the selected 
reinforcement learning algorithm for the players’ pro- 
files definition has been the revised Roth-Erev, with 
equal value of the algorithms weight. The past expe- 
rience weight W value is set to 0.4, a small value to 
grant higher influence to the most recent results, so that 
it can quickly learn and catch new tendencies in play- 
ers’ actions. For each scenario the scaling factors for 
competitors’ probable price λ and limit price ϕ, will be 
equal for every competitor agent, in order to give the 
same importance to the price forecast of each agent. 
These scaling factors will only vary from scenario to 
scenario, but always maintaining the equality among 
agents. 
The variations introduced in each simulation are as 
follows. 
In the first simulation Seller 2 will use the scenario 
analysis method with a small number of considered 
scenarios and possible bids. This test will allow us to 
perceive if a restrict group of scenarios, and conse- 
quent advantage in processing speed, will be reflected 
on a big difference in the results quality. For this sim- 
ulation the number of considered scenarios is 3, the 
number of considered bids is 5, and the interval for the 
possible bids definition is 8. Considering the 3 scenar- 
ios, the first will attribute to all agents λ = 1 and ϕ = 
0; the second λ = 0,95 and ϕ  = 0,05; and the third 
λ = 0,9 and ϕ = 0,1. These values give higher impor- 
tance to the most probable prices, in order to consider 
the most realistic scenarios. 
In the second simulation Seller 2 will use the sce- 
nario analysis method with an intermediate number of 
considered scenarios and possible bids. The number of 
considered scenarios is 5, the number of considered 
bids is 7, and the interval for the possible bids defini- 
tion is 8. Considering the 5 scenarios, the first will at- 
tribute to all agents λ = 1 and ϕ = 0; the second λ = 
0,95 and ϕ = 0,05; the third λ = 0,9 and ϕ = 0,1; the 
fourth λ = 0,8 and ϕ = 0,2; and the fifth λ = 0,7 and 
ϕ = 0,3. 
Finally, in the third simulation Seller 2 will use the 
method with a higher number of considered scenarios 
and possible bids, in order to obtain a more detailed 
analysis. The number of considered scenarios is 7, the 
number of considered bids is 10, and the interval for 
the possible bids definition is 10, granting also a bigger 
interval for considered bids. Considering the 7 scenar- 
ios, the first will attribute to all agents λ = 1 and ϕ = 
0; the second λ = 0,95 and ϕ = 0,05; the third λ = 
0,9 and ϕ = 0,1; the fourth λ = 0,8 and ϕ = 0,2; the 
fifth λ = 0,7 and ϕ = 0,3; the sixth λ = 0,5 and ϕ = 
0,5; and the seventh λ = 0,2 and ϕ = 0,8. 
After the simulations, the incomes obtained by 
Seller 2 using the proposed method with each of the 
three combinations of parameters can be compared. 
This agent’s power production to be negotiated in the 
market will remain constant at 50 MW for each pe- 
riod throughout the simulations. Regarding the costs of 
all players, they are defined as null, for facilitating the 
comparison of the results. 
4.2. Results 
Since the reinforcement learning algorithm for the 
players’ profiles definition treats each period of the day 
C 
B 
A 
 A 
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comes in the first period of each considered day, along 
the 16 days, using each of the three considered combi- 
nations of parameters. 
Figure 4 Presents the results of Seller 2 in the twelfth 
period of each considered day. 
Figure 5 presents the comparison between the three 
parameterizations of the game theory strategy and the 
other two strategies’ performance: The AMES strat- 
egy, and the SA-QL. 
 
4.3. Discussion of the results 
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Fig. 4. Incomes obtained by Seller 2 in the twelfth period of the 
considered 16 days, using: A) the first parameterization, B) the 
second parameterization, C) the third parameterization. (Colours 
are visible in the online version of the article; http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.3233/ICA-130438) 
 
 
Fig. 5. Total incomes obtained by Seller 2 for the considered 16 days. 
 
as a distinct case, the analysis of the development of 
the performance must be done for each period individ- 
ually. Figure 3 presents the evolution of Seller 2    in- 
Comparing the graphs presented in Fig. 3, it can be 
concluded that the first simulation was clearly the most 
disadvantageous for Seller 2 for this period. The sec- 
ond and third simulations present very similar results 
in what concerns the incomes obtained by this agent in 
the first period. 
The results of the twelfth period (Fig. 4) show the 
first parameterization worst results when compared 
with the other two. However, in this case, the third pa- 
rameterization clearly obtained better results than the 
second one. The global results for all periods of the 
considered 16 days, presented in Fig. 5, support this 
tendency. 
From Fig. 5 it is visible that the first parameteriza- 
tion presents a large difference from the other two, and 
a smaller difference between the results achieved by 
the second and third parameterizations can be clearly 
seen. The comparison of the different parameteriza- 
tions’ performances allows taking an important con- 
clusion: when it is required for the simulations to im- 
prove the processing times, a criterious reduction of the 
search space may not represent a significant decrease 
of the method’s effectiveness. As proven by simulation 
2, which even though considering fewer scenarios and 
possible bids than the parameterization of simulation 3, 
its results were still acceptable for situations for which 
the method’s processing time is crucial. 
Regarding the comparison between the use of the 
game theory strategy and the other two comparing 
strategies, it is visible that the first parameterization  
of the proposed strategy achieves lower results than 
the two reference strategies. This was expected and it 
is easily justified by the low number of scenarios and 
possible bids that this parameterization concerned. The 
second parameterization achieves very similar results 
to the ones obtained by the two reference strategies. 
This means that, even using an intermediate number of 
scenarios and bids, the proposed game theory strategy 
is capable of achieving levels of performance that are 
  
similar to the results of reference and well established 
strategies. In what concerns to the third parameteriza- 
tion, it is capable of achieving best results than any of 
the other strategies, for the considered days. This is a 
motivating result, suggesting that the proposed method 
is able to provide better results to a market negotiat- 
ing player’s actions, when the parameters are suitably 
defined. 
 
5. Conclusions and future work 
 
This paper proposed a computational model for bid 
definition in electricity markets. The proposed model 
comprises the definition of markets scenarios, concern- 
ing different perspectives and the electricity markets 
evolution; other players profiles definitions, based on 
the analysis of the gathered information through pre- 
diction algorithms; the establishment of a set of pos- 
sible actions taking into account each current context 
and the adaptation of the game theory concept to the 
electricity market negotiation environment, intended 
for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving 
the equilibrium in the market. The proposed method 
was integrated in MASCEM, an electricity market sim- 
ulator developed by the authors’ research centre. 
The model proves to be adequate for providing deci- 
sion support to electricity markets players, allowing an 
analysis of different scenarios, taking into account the 
predictions of competitor players’ actions. 
The results presented in the experimental findings 
section show that it can achieve good results when 
using suitable parameterizations, as in simulation 3. 
These good results are also shown not to be directly 
proportional to the scenarios search space, which is a 
relevant aspect when dealing with timely exigent sim- 
ulations. This conclusion facilitates the adaptability of 
analysis in the neighborhood of the scenario selected 
by the algorithm. To achieve this, an evolutionary ap- 
proach will be included and combined with the game 
theory. 
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